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ABSTRACT
High error rates in entitlements and slow responses to
client complaints by Federal agencies are analyzed from a
r.arket-power frame of reference focusing on the relative
powerlessness of agency clients in relation to agencies which
hold monopolies of life sustaining benefits. Data from a
survey of Members of Congress are presented to provide an
estimate of error rates. Three alternative structural
solutions to the problem of unresponsiveness are assessed, in-
cluding increased congressional casework service, ombudsmen
services, and use of Federal Information Centers to aid clients.
Necessary quality control procedures to facilitate each
solution are described.
SECTION I: INTRODUCTION
The United States Veterans Administration (VA), and the
Social Security Administration of the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (SSA), are monopolies. They
*Requests for reprints should be sent to the School of
Social Work, Box 2, Barry College, Miami, Florida 33161.
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each have life-sustaining goods and services to dispense, such
as medical care, pension checks, compensation payments, and
educational support stipends. Each agency disperses these goods
and services to citizen-consumers, frequently called clients,
according to statutes, regulations, policies and guidelines of
entitlement which vary in specificity. If the citizen-consumer
is dissatisfied with the service rendered, or is denied a
benefit he feels entitled to, there are no competitor services
to turn to. A government bureau lives on its annual budget
grant from Congress (or the State), not upon the citizen-con-
sumer's voluntary payments for purchases. Thus, the dissatis-
fied consumer has nothing of value to withold from the bureau-
cracy to compel better service.
The nature of the relationship between the client and the
government agency is fundamentally different from the market
relationship between the customer and business enterprises, as
has been noted by social welfare authors (Thompson, 1965). Two
differences are most important. First, every supermarket, gas
station or department store competes for the trade of the
ciistomer because the customer has something they want, money.
If the customer is not happy at one oas station he may take
his money and car to a competing one across the street. Com-
petition between sellers, and the possession of money with
which to buy, gives each consumer some power to either achieve
satisfaction at one store or go elsewhere to obtain the product.
However, the Medicaid recipient who is, for instance, denied
payment for medical care, and the veteran who's monthly student
stipend checks mysteriously cease have no competitor to whom
to go and no purchase money to withold (Lewis, 1975).
It is thus not surprising that large numbers of citizens,
editorialists, and elected officials have found that the mono-
polistic, life sustaining government bureaus are frequently
unresponsive to complaints of error or delays. (Carter, 1978;
Technical Assistance Research Program, 1976; Gellhorn, 1967;
Chiles, 1975.) The bureaus need not make fewer errors nor
more rapid responses to complaints to survive and to grow,
unlike a business enterprise in even a moderately ccmpetive
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environment. The same problems of errors and delay in en-
titlements are cross-cultural (Gellhorn, 1967), and are
present in other, non-governmental monopolies, such as electric
utilities (Singer, 1977).
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate from data
gathered in 1975 the extent of the problem of bureaucratic un-
responsiveness and error in entitlements, as measured by the
volume of consumer complaints against federal and state
bureaucracies dispensing life sustaining goods and services
which were registered in the offices of Members of Congress.
A lack of empirical data in the field has been described
earlier by experts as a serious handicap to study and analysis
of the client complaint problem (Kravitz, 1972). This paper
will also describe and assess three remedies to increase re-
sponsiveness to clients and reduce errors in entitlements
currently being used or actively considered in the Federal
establishment. These remedies include increasing the capacity
of the Members of Congress to process the complaints of more
of their constituents by adding casework staff and by establish-
ing a central complaint service bureau in Congress (Reuss, 1963;
Hechler, 1969). We call this remedy the Political Solution.
Complaint handling by Congressmen offers one distinctly
attractive feature. It places the client in a role similar to
a customer of a business, in that the client is a Congressman's
constituent, and has a vote to cast or withold. Thus, the
client has some power. The second remedy, which we call the
Executive Branch Solution, includes such strategies as the
use of the Federal Information Centers, operated by the
federal General Services Administration, to accept and process
cnmplaints by phone or letter, and to advocate with the bureaus
for the client. (University Digest, Center for Governmental
Responsibility, 1978.) Coupled with this approach are re-
lated technical-structural suggestions from consultants
(Technical Assistance Research Reports, 1976, 1977) for im-
proving internal control in the bureaus. The third remedy
to be described and assessed is the Ombudsman Response, in
which special or general purpose advocates are established
high in government to deal with the bureaus on behalf of the
client.
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We will suggest that the actual scope of the problem of
governmental delay and error in entitlements remains unclear
because of poor record keeping and research, but thiat clearly
the data which is available so far indicates thz problem is
mammoth. We will also suggest that any remedies for the
problem, either Political, Executive, or Ombudsmen, to succeed
will also require that the managerial cadres of the bureaus
understand the principles of industrial quality control and of
communication, and are able to utilize these principles. We
argue that without sound programs of quality control, crror
rates and response delay rates will remain high, no matter the
type of remedy applied. We will arque that in the abserce of
a market relationship between client and dispensing bureau,
Congress should require and enforce quality control stenidards
for errors and delays in the Executive branch agencies through
maniplation of bureau budgets and executive promotional
systems as the best defense for the client and society against
error and unresponsiveness.
SECTION II: ELEMENTS OF BUREAUCRATIC UNRESPONSIVEAESS
At least three kinds of official behavior are incuded in
the widely used, but vague concept, bureaucratic inresponslve-
ness. It is important to distinguish between these behaviors
for analysis and problem-solving.
First, the phrase bureaucratic unresponsiveness appears
to cover extensive time delays between a client first contacting
an agency with a problem and his receipt of a definitive reply.
President Carter recently referred to this sense of the term
when he said
When private citizens seek the simpiest
form of help from their governmcnt, too
often they get only waits, unanswered
letters, complicated forms, referrals
to other agencies and plain inaction
(Carter, May 26, 1978).
While clear standards for promptness of reply frequently do not
seem to exist in the large government agencies (Technical
Assistant Research Programs Report, December i976). however a
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meaningful response within three weeks is a measure now being
used to establish national baseline rates. These researchers
determined by analysis of a sample of complaints received at
the national headquarters of eight service agencies that only
two, the Public Health Service and the National Park Service,
were able to respond to complaints within three weeks. Neither
the massive V.A. nor the Social Security Administration,
dealing with millions of Americans' health and income dollars,
met this standard. Interestingly, in a study of ombudsman
services in 9 nations, one researcher found that slowness in
official decision-making and review is similarily a major
source of citizen complaints. Our experience with SSA in-
dicates that when complaints from citizens are forwarded
through Congressional casework staffs, 3-9 day response times
are the rule! Two other large, human service bureaus, Social
and Rehabilitation Service of U.S.D.H.E.W. and the Manpower
Administration of the Labor Department also failed the 3-week
test. We should note of course that delay is also one way to
not remedy an error. Singer has cogently described the pro-
cess of overlong delays as a "delay circuit," a bureaucratic
behavior aimed at avoiding confrontation with error and the
need to make decisions (Singer, op. cit.).
A second element of responsiveness is clarity of the
communication to the citizen. A timely response written in
Jargon, or in legal language beyond the reading level of
the recipient, is of little value, and is as frustrating as
is a long-delayed response. Effective administrative
communication has been described by writers as requiring
receiver comprehension and feedback (Ehlers, et al., 1976),
and as a necessary link between executives, employees and
clients (Bellows, 1960). Overuse of jargon and technical
language is a frequently identified administrative problem
(Ehlers, op. cit.), yet it seems to characterizes most re-
sponses to complaints from the large service bureaus. A
letter carrying an important decision or explanation might
be judged to be clear if it would be clear from the point of
view of the likely level of education and understanding of
the writer of the complaint (Technical Assistance Research
Report, October, 1976). While exact data is not available,
our observations in one Congressional office (Rep. William
Lehman, Florida) handling a high volume of client complaints
is that overly legalistic, obscure, lengthy and jargon
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filled writing characterize the bureau's communications and
is incomprehensible to the poor, elderly, and the foreign
born in particular.
The third element of bureaucratic behavior of concern,
perhaps the most important, is the actual rate of errors made
in decisions on entitlements, and the response speed at which
these errors are rectified once the client calls attention
to them by complaint. Of course, the possibilities for error
are enormous in agencies which process millions of pension
allocations, medical payments and similar decisions monthly.
The bureaus carry out this work in a maze of regulations and
rules which must frequently be interpreted by lower officials
who have some discretionary power. In one national study in
New Zealand it was found that most citizen complaints arose
in discretionary situations where the citizen felt that a
legitimate rule was being applied unfairly or unwisely in
their case (Weeks, 1969). For instance, few people directly
challenge the SSA rule that earned income must be reported,
but many may challenge whether SSA has applied correctly the
complex formula for deducting earned income from a particular
pensioners check. Again, few would challenge the rule that
Medicare will only pay for certain treatments for specific
diseases. But, many will argue that an elderly, sick lady
who has no way of knowing that an optional therapy ordered
by her physician will be disallowed ought not to be billed to
her. We may call these "discretionary errors" because they
require individual official interpretations of varying sets
of facts, and an official has several options available.
"Absolute errors" are those such as arithmetic miscalculations
or computer input mistakes which result in a client being
paid too little, or not being paid at all. Reducing both
types of error in service agencies is a valuable goal for
management.
The process by which errors are repaired or resolved in
an agency when a client complains or appeals is important. In
order to repair errors, an organization needs policies and
procedures which authorize and direct specific personnel to do
so, linking the complaint receivers to reviewing authorities
and then to decision makers. We call these linkages repair
-560-
circuits. The Technical Assistance Research Project (1976)
found that the central offices of the social service bureau-
cracies did not have clear repair circuits. At the same time,
surveys of these clients indicated the agencies had poor
Images to them (Ibid, 1976). Apparently the current baseline
response time is so low and the time delays in the repair
circuits so long that the complaint processing procedures which
do exist actually harm agency images!
We cannot judge the extent to which any set of error
complaints such as these by clients are accurate or unreason-
able, especially in the discretionary areas, for the large
bureaus without other detailed studies. But, data from the
New York City Welfare Department may provide some hints. A new
appeal unit there found that in 70% of clients appeals to the
unit the agency staff resolved the problem immediately for the
client. Apparently, most client complaints of discretionary
or absolute error were correct. (Levinson, 1970)
The problems of complaints by clients and errors by
agencies will probably always be with us to some extent. It
is reasonable to state that any proposed efforts at reducing
rates or remedying the errors should aim for goals of reducing
verified errors, resolving client complaints fairly in a brief
time period, and communicating official actions clearly to the
client. Improvement in repair circuits, communication methods,
and quality control standards will all be needed to achieve
these goals.
SECTION III: A SURVEY STUDY OF CLIENT COMPLAINTS TO MEMBERS
OF CONGRESS
"Everyone of the 535 Senators and Congressmen in Washington
is an ombudsman .... Everyone of us knows it, and a great
many of our constituents know it too," said former U.S. Senator
Ed Gurney (Ibid, 1970, p. 5), describing the complaint
handling and client advocacy service offered by most Members
of Congress. both Senators and Representatives (Hereafter
Members of Congress are referred to as Members. This con-
vention describes both males and females.). Congressional
casework is the term generally used to describe services to
constituents by Members aimed at helping constituents resolve
personal problems relating to Social Security, Veterans benefits,
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unemployment claims and similar social service entitlements
(Butler, 1966). The service is usually short-term, it may be
carried out mostly by phone or letter. Casework here does
not connote a treatment relationship. However, the term
casework is occasionally also used to describe broader ser-
vices, such as aiding a corporation with a federal regulatory
body. The volume of constituent clients who ask a Member and
his staff to help them with an entitlement case the client
believes to represent an error or a needless delay is one
valuable indicator of the scope of the error problem. Further,
data gathered from Congressional casework services may be
used to roughly guage which federal services seem less re-
sponsive, which nre. Such data may also be useful in com-
paring the responsiveness of the repair circuits activated by
the client alone, and activated by the client and Member
together. This section describes previous reported attempts
to measure congressional casework, and data from our survey
study of Congressional casework.
HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON CONGRESSIONAL CASEWORK
Congress first formally concerned itself with the scope
of casework services in 1945, during hearings on the Organi-
zation and Work of the Congress (U.S. Congress, Joint Com-
mittee, 1945). Representative Benjamin Wallace urged an
empirical study be begun to provide more exact data than was
being gathered through the hearings, which were primarily
impressionistic (Ibid., 1945, p. 910). By 1966 four studies
based on samples of from 10 to 160 Congressional offices were
completed and reported (Clapp, 1963; Davidson, 1965; Saloma,
1966; Gellhorn, 1966). None gathered data on complaints
against specific federal agencies.
Saloma (op. cit.) approached the question by studying
casework mail volume and staff time utilization. In the
sample offices, casework mail accounted for an average of
15.4% of total mail, with some offices reporting casework
mail as 40% of their total. Casework complaints were reported
by the Members studied to be the second largest claim on
their time.
Gellhorn (op. cit.) studied a sample of 10 offices of
Members of the House of Representatives. He found that an
average of 124 letters per week were received concerning In-
dividual cases. However, his definition was more broad than
that given above and included some materials not usually
classified as casework complaints. He calculated that 51
new cases per week were dealt with in each office in his
sample.
Gellhorn had several reservations about his data, in-
cluding the possibility of high fluctuations in volume over
time, and possible duplications of cases. However, this study
merits attention because It developed a baseline of cases.
Davidson's (op. cit.) study found that 78% of Congressmen
felt casework intervention should be part of their job, but
that 58% felt it was too great a burden on their time.
Clapp (op. cit.) found that most Congressional staff
time was spent on such constituent affairs as casework com-
plaints.
Kravitz (1972), writing for the Congressional Research
Service, summarized the studies to that date and bemoaned the
lack of quality, data-based studies. He noted the particular
need to quantify requests for help according to the agency
involved, to assess the success of Member interventions, and
to quantify the number of new cases occuring. He did not
disagree with Gellhorn's 1966 conclusion that the volume
of complaint cases appeared to be rising.
SURVEY METHOD
For the purposes of this study Congressional Casework was
defined as the process involving utilization of the Congressman
(Senator) and his staff with an individual constituent or
family in solving problems with governmental agencies. Con-
gressional staff were instructed to not include in their
response "assistance given to groups, associations or other
organizations."
An anonymous questionnaire was sent to 100% of the Members
of Congress (N=535), with a letter from a Member introducing
the survey as scholarly research. 125 Member's offices re-
turned the questionnaire (24%).
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FINDINGS
The staff directors were asked to list the 5 government
agencies their records showed were most frequently contacted
concerning client-constituent complaints. As Table I indi-
cates, the bureaus responsible for the large pension, health,
and welfare programs are the most frequent targets of case-
work service.
The Social Security Administration operates the Social
Security pension system, several forms of income assistance,
and the Medicare program of health insurance. Ninety-two of
125 (73.5%) offices considered the agency the main target of
their efforts. The Social Security complaint rate was
followed by the U.S. Veteran's Administration, the adminis-
trator of the Veterans disability and pension systems, health
care system (it is the nation's largest hospital operator),
home mortgage guarantee program, and the student stipend
program for veterans.
The officcs were asked to report the average number of
new casework cases handled by their offices during the year.
One hundred sixteen offices responded, reporting an average
of 85 new cases weekly. Only a few reported less than 25
new cases per week. Recalling the earlier report by a
leading scholar in the field of citizen complaints and Ccn-
gressional activity (Gellhorn, 1966) of an average
new case rate of 51 per week, the data fro this much
larger sample indicates a 66% increase in voiume over a
nine year period. If all 535 Members of Congress serve the
same number of new cases per week, then about 2,000,000 per
year are served or reported. Allowing for duplications
(e.g. the same client contacting two or more Members) errors
in records, and possible sample bias, we still may conclude
that a very large number of clients, perhaps as much as
3/4 of 1% of the population, use Congressional casework
services, primarily with health and welfare agencies.
Eighty five percent of the offices believed the volume
of casework was increasing over the previous year by an
average of 24%.
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When asked to rate their own effectiveness in solving
constituent problems, the Congressional staff's estimated
their own success, as shown on Table II. Uncorroborated
positive self-evaluations must always be viewed with caution,
of course.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The descriptive data gathered by questionnaire reported
here adds further concrete information to our knowledge base
about client complaints of error and delay by federal social
service bureas. The data indicates that a very large number
of Americans have sufficient difficulties with the bureaus
administering important entitlements that they go to their
Senators or Congressmen to importune for help. The clients
most frequent complaints are against the Social Security
Administration and the Veterans Administration. This survey
research supplements and tends to corroborate work a decade
earlier which showed somewhat lower, but increasing, volumes
of casework (Gellhorn, op. cit.). More recent research
describing excessive delays in responding to complaints in
the same federal agencies (Technical Assistance Research
Reports, op. cit.) may offer one explanation why so many
people resort to their Congressman for aid.
More data is needed on this important subject. It
would be particularly valuable to carry out a public opinion
study of clients who have used Congressional casework ser-
vice to determine their levels of satisfaction, and to com-
pare this Information with existing data on the satisfaction
levels of clients using complaint services offered by the
bureaus themselves. A sample study of both complaints
lodged with the bureaus and with Congressmen to determine a
base rate of actual error is a crucial, unmet gap.
SECTION IV: ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF REDUCING ERROR AND IN-
CREASING RESPONSIVENESS TO SOCIAL SERVICE CONSUMERS
This paper noted earlier that the nature of the market
relationship between a government agency and its clients is
monopolistic. There are no competing sources of veteran's
stipends or Medicare reimbursements for doctor's expenses.
We also noted that clients are without power in this market;
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If they do not claim an entitlement the bureau loses nothing.
Clients have nothing of value to withhold from bureaus because
bureaus live on their annual budgets from Congress. It has
been demonstrated by other writers that clients are routinely
dissatisfied with the bureaus, both for absolute errors and
for discretionary errors. Failure to respond at all to com-
plaints or lengthy response delays have been documented, and
at least one writer (Singer, op. cit.) has argued that these
delays are purposeful behavior by both public and private
monopolies. Reducing these delays and error rates, and in-
creasing the understandability of written communication to
clients are social and administrative goals worth pursuing to
Improve service to clients.
This section will analyze three commonly proposed alter-
native programs to improve responsiveness and lower error
rates. Each alternative will be evaluated from the point of
view of how they do or do not promise to alter the market
relationships which we view as the root of the problem We
shall also consider the political viability of each. The
third aspect to be evaluated will be technical feasibility,
that is, the degree to which a proposed program's needed
administrative structures and technologies are available to,
and are useable in the large social welfare agencies of
government. The fourth aspect to be assessed is whether the
solution holds promise of providing systematic improvement,
or only improved responses to particular cases.
OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICA
The classic, Scandinavian model of the ombudsman defines
that person as an independent, high ranking official who re-
ceives complaints from the public about governmental actions,
investigates complaints of all types, has access to agency
files, may usually compel agencies to explain their actions,
and may recommend remedies for both individual cases and for
general problems. (Levinson, op. cit.) Many countries in
the Capitalist, Socialist, and Third World sectors hsve
adopted some form of ombudsman model to assist citizens
(Gellhorn, 1967). Legislation to establish a U.S. Ombudsman
Office has been introduced and defeated in Congress many times
since 1965 (Weeks, 1969), but several states have enacted
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specialized or general ombudsman offices. For example,
Minnesota has an ombudsman for its prisoners, and Florida
has ombudsman committees for nursing home patients and those
In Institutions for the retarded. New Jersey and Nebraska
have a state-wide ombudsman, following Hawaii, the first
state to adopt Ombudsman legislation. (Gellhorn, 1970)
There are wide variations in the level of authority, breadth
of jurisdiction, independance and authority to compel com-
pliance in the various ombudsman offices. In no instance
could the writers locate an elected ombudsman. The slow
increase In the development of specialized and state level
ombudsman programs has parallelled the growth of the consumer
movement and the human rights movements.
The ombudsman service usually operates by taking com-
plaints from the public, and then carrying out staff investi-
gations. In the Scandinavian model, the staff have access
to official files and may compel agency staff to respond
to questioning. If the ombudsman office is highly placed,
reporting to the Governor or Prime Minister, the recommeda-
tions for remediation in cases, and for changes in agency
systems or policies carry great force. The ombudsman offices
In Scandinavia serve all citizens with any important com-
plaint against the government.
Would ombudsman services change the market and power
relationships between U.S. clients and the federal social
welfare agencies? At least two features would need to be
present to do so. First, the federal agencies would need
to perceive that the interest of the ombudsman in a case
had potential positive or negative consequences to them.
If the agency perceives that the good will or political
power of the ombudsman is valuable (or dangerous) to it,
we can predict the development of speedy repair circuits
tuned towards the ombudsman staff. For instance, if an
ombudsman can affect an agency appropriation, or the career
of a high executive of an agency, or an agencies press
Image, we would expect to see agency responsiveness increase.
A second necessary feature for success would be the perception
by the ombudsman that the client had something of value to
the ombudsman, to give or to withhold as a consumer. If
the good will or support of clients is necessary for the
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ombudsman to retain office, then it could be predicted the
office will act promptly and persistently to aid cases it
sees as just, and to deal courteously with those clients it
believes do not have well-founded cases. Ombudsman offices
which meet these tests would have the ability to alter the
market power relations now prevailing between clients and
agencies.
The political viability of proposals for high-power
ombudsman offices is not good in this country. Congress has
consistently refused to establish a federal ombudsman office.
It is widely concluded that Members of Congress prefer to
serve complaint cases and thus oppose any proposal to establish
a competitor or remove the function from them. (Anderson,
1969; Gelihorn, 1970; Anderson, 1972) Representative Ken
Hechler probably spoke for most Members when he said in 1969
"....it would be an abdication of our responsibilities as
Members of Congress if casework were turned over to an
ombudsman...." (Anderson, op. cit., p. 16) It has been
asserted that legislators at the state and federal level per-
ceive that casework serves their best interests. (Gellhorn,
1970) That interest is widely perceived to be votes. An
old adage in Congressional circles is that "One satisfied
constituent equals ten votes on election day." Despite fer-
vent statements like Hechler's, it is clear that a Members
federally paid staff of 3-10 caseworkers, generating an
average of three appeal and complaint letters per case
(Butler, op. cit.), must help many people, most of whom can
be expected to be greatful on election day. A modest proposal
to merely provide a central Congressional Complaint Office
to serve all Congressmen has repeatedly failed. (Anderson,
1969)
The political opposition to proposals for high power
ombudsman offices also includes the V.A. bureaucracy. It has
regularily testified against ombudsman proposals. The V.A.
argues that the Veterans Representatives and veterans group's
contact persons do the advocacy job well enough. (Anderson,
1969)
The low probability that high power ombudsman offices
will be enacted is reflected in the recent decline in legis-
lative proposals, and in scholarship in the area from the
1965-1970 peak of interest. However, specialized and state
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level ombudsman offices are still slowly developing. Rarely
do they possess high political power as defined here, or as
Is common in Scandinavia.
The federal agencies would find it necessary to establish
complaint-liaison officers to deal with an ombudsman's staff.
This role would require access to files, the ability to cross
Internal departmental authority lines, the power to recommend
to a high authority in the agency action to be taken to
rectify errors, and to reply to the ombudsman rapidly. Such
technical abilities could only be based on vastly improved
complaint files and procedures. Each agency would need to
designate an executive who could issue rectifying orders
rapidly all through the agency. These changes appear feasible,
though expensive.
The federal ombudsman proposal has the very attractive
feature of potentially stimulating system-wide changes in
agencies in how complaints are processed. The actual rates
of error In entitlement decisions could be positively affected.
A large federal ombudsman program could handle enough cases
to detect systematic problems. Data based reports from large
numbers of cases and policy recommendations could be in-
fluential. However, because no known ombudsman programs in
the U.S. have any direct control over service agency budgets
and appointments, and are frequently only advisory, their
ability to bring about procedural changes varies greatly and
Is rarely high.
SECTION V: CONGRESSIONAL CASEWORK SERVICES
Good Congressional caseworkers are a valuable commodity in
short supply. New Congressmen have been advised by experienced
Members to seek and hold onto good ones. (Tacheron and Udall,
1966) While it is not known exactly how many Members offer
extensive casework service, we uncovered none in our sample
which did not do some. Each of the 435 Members of the House
of Representatives has at least one District Office and a
Washington Office, while the 100 Senators have Washington
Offices and often two or more state offices. There are thus
at least 535 offices in the various states to which a citizen
may take a complaint, if he or she is aware of the service.
Congressmen often aggressively seek out client-constituents
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through mobile service offices with well publicized routes,
and through newsletters mailed free to each household re-
presented by the office-holder.
Members offer casework service to thei: constituents for
two reasons. One is "....some Members and their staffs sin-
cerely believe that with the increasing complexity and scope
of government involvements in the daily lives of citizens, the
Congressman serves as one of the few remaining links between
the Individual and a depersonalized state." (Butler, op. cit.,
P. 5) And, they know their clout helps. (Butler, op. cit.)
Another reason is that they believe casework gets votes.
(Gellhorn, 1970) Referring specifically to casework to help
people with social security and veterans benefits, one Member
lauded his staff recently and noted about the clients that in
the upcoming election "....they're going to support me."
(Burke, Miami Herald, June 4, 1978)
The fact that a social security pensioner with a com-
plaint is also a voter gives him something of value to prof-
fer or withhold from a Member. A constituent's vote, and his
help telling his spouse and friends to vote, are the currency
of electoral politics. Thus, according to our theory it is
predictable that many Members will have aggressive, large
casework services, and that these services will generate a high
level of inquiry and appeal calls and letters promptly for
constituents. An implied quid pro quo relationship exists
between Member and constituent.1
Members sit on appropriations and oversight committees
which control the budgets of the agencies. An agency which
consistently causes trouble for a Senator who sits on a key
appropriations committee incurs a geniune danger. Even a
critical press release from a Member can cause harm to an
agency temporarily, and to the career of an official in the
ICampaign Conittees of a Member may purchase the com-
puterized lists of names a Member has aided. Thus, they may
be campaigned to personally by letter or phone and enlisted
to aid the re-election bid of the Member who helped them.
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agency, as well. Thus the agencies perceive that the good will
of a Member is a commodity of great valve.
We conclude that Congressional casework services do change
the market power relationship between clients and agencies.
Members need the votes of clients, and agencies need the votes
of the Members. The expansion of this service so that it is
available to all clients who need it may be argued from this
basis alone.
The political viability of the current, uneven level, of
Congressional casework is secure. Should Congress choose to
expand their staffs to increase constituent services, it is
probable that a majority could be assembled to do so.
Congressional casework has already spawned a network of
liaison workers in the agencies who respond to the vast flow of
calls and letters from Congressional aides. These liaison
workers operate at local, regional and national levels. Re-
pair circuits are in place between the bureaus and the Con-
gressional caseworkers, but they have not been closely studied.
Experience in one Member's office (where the second author is
the Member's principal aide) indicates that the Regional
Social Security Administration office routinely responds to
staff in 9 days or less, a dramatic difference from the
observation that client complaints rarely are served in less
than three weeks. Apparently, these Congressional repair
circuits are closely linked to executives of sufficient power
to rectify errors and settle cases. The exact scope and size
of the liaison-repair circuits is not known. However, in 1966
the Executive Department's central offices alone had 500
Congressional liaison staff at work, handling casework as well
as legislative matters (Butler, op. cit.).
Congressional casework seems unlikely to spawn systematic
improvements in error rates, nor systematic improvements in the
speed and clarity of the federal agency's responses to clients.
The casework system is idiosyncratic, depending entirely on the
Member's interests and beliefs and security in office. One
Member may offer extensive services to constituents, while the
next little or none if he so desires. Each case is dealt with
separately with no one apparently aggregating complaint and
error data systematically. The system may help individuals,
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case by case, but without general standards and records which
are comparable across the 535 Members offices there is little
prospect that meaningful system level changes will ensue.
Skilled caseworkers will continue to advocate for clients
with individual liaison workers, case by case.
FEDERAL COMPLAINT SERVICE
The General Services Administration of the United States
is exploring the use of operatives in its network of Federal
Information Centers (FIC) offices nationwide to aid citizens
with complaints. By calling a no-toll number in an experi-
mental state, citizens will be offered help by clerical
employees in effecting complaints and remedying errors with
federal agencies. Accurate records on complaints will be
maintained and GSA will receive reports on complaint origins
and types of resolution. User satisfaction surveys are
possible. It is hoped that the GSA experiment will provide
a universal service which helps clients and which can aggre-
gate data useful to the Executive branch in improving manage-
ment. While consciously planned after the Congressional
casework model, this experiment will not provide face-to-face
service, except for those who might live near the two centers
In the experimental state (University Digest, February 7,
1978).
The FIC approach to casework would need to be politically
acceptable to the Members of Congress to be established
nationwide. The history of Ombudsman legislation would point
to a limited chance for enactment if the program is per-
ceived as a substitute for Congressional casework. If the
program is seen as supplemental to the effort of the Members'
own staff, it may have a viable future.
An exceedingly attractive feature of the FIC experiment
is that it offers the possibility of aggregating accurate
complaint data in each FIC district to help fill in the huge
Information gaps about complaint rates, agency response
speed and style, and client variables.
The FIC approach can partially alter the market power
relationships at the point at which its reports and reviews
of agency error and complaint performance are seen by the
-574-
agencies as having the power to influence appropriations
or executive careers. At this time, GSA has no such power
of its own. However, the GSA can transmit "efficiency"
reports to the President and Cabinet officers. If the
Secretaries and President chose, they can set goals for error
reduction and client satisfaction, and then use the FIC re-
ports to assess progress. A second question is, does the
client with a complaint have anything of value to offer to FIC
to obtain rapid, courteous, aggressive help? Nothing Is per-
ceived comparable to the vote and good will that the same
client has to exchange with a Member who is of help. As a
result, it is uncertain whether the FIC clerical staff will
produce results comparable to a Member of Congress.
Only Congressional casework provides at this time for
an altered market power relationship between individual clients
and the federal agencies controlling the life-sustaining
entitlements. This power-change is relevant to the client in
remedying the particular error and is not transferred to him
personally. It is temporary power. Casework by Members is
discretionary, thus quite an uneven resource from District
to District.
Higher than acceptable error rates and slower than
acceptable complaint response times indicate that the agencies
have not developed modern quality control systems and error
repair circuits for their products, the entitlements of
pensions, stipends, and health care payments given to their
"customers." Rapid responses to Members of Congress indicates
that when these high-power persons advocate for a client,
error repair circuits are promptly activated. A review of
the elements of modern quality control systems will indicate
the structures necessary to systematically lower error rates
and speed response times for ordinary clients. A review of
social welfare administration textbooks commonly used to
train graduate managers will be described, pointing to
generally inadequate treatment of quality control.
SECTION VI: ELEMENTS OF QUALITY CONTROL
Quality control systems are routine organizational pro-
cedures by which products and services are regularly sampled
by Inspectors and compared with norms and standards for
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quality and quantity of product before delivery to the con-
sumer. Products which do not meet standards of tolerance are
rejected. High reject rates trigger problem-solving efforts
by management which receives regular quality control reports.
(Shewhart, 1932) Such systems in industry reject calculators
which dont add, reject batches of drugs which are incorrectly
formulated, and approve or reject aircraft engines, for ex-
ample. While not perfect, quality control systems function
to keep errors in tolerable limits and to signal system level
problems. White (1950) noted the elements of quality control
which should be present in social welfare services. These
include the formulation of measureable, minimum standards of
services, the carrying out of continuous sample studies of
cases, charting the results on control charts for use by
management, and establishing indexes of performance by agency
units. Managers would use these procedures to monitor quality,
to supervise supervisors, and to seek the cause of high levels
of error. It might be added that linking executive retention
and promotion to low error rates in entitlement decisions in
divisions under that executive would give added dimension to
quality control systems.
2
The accuracy of entitlement grants and reimbursements to
clients are subjects for which measureable standards might be
formulated and enforced. Routine reviews of samples of payments
and of discretionary decisions would be necessary. Quality
control personnel could detect changes in error rates which
would be visible to executives in routine reports. Response
times to complaints, complaint rates, and clarity of letters
to clients are also subject to clear standard setting and
quality inspection. Social Security calculations, Medicare
reinbursements, and decisions about V.A. student support
checks are not mysteries. They are measureable events, and as
such subject to modern quality control adapted correctly
2The Civil Service Reform and Reorganization introduced
by President Carter provides for rewarding high performance
executives and managers with bonuses, as in industry, and
dismissing consistently poor executives. This proposal
covers executives at the current GS-16 to Executive Level
IX pay grades, the Senior Executives, as well as the 72,000
managers in GS-13 through GS-16 grades. (White House Summary,
April, 1978)
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by professional managers.
3
TEACHING QUALITY CONTROL METHODS
After White's pioneer Social Welfare text (White, 1950)
administration texts commonly used by management students in
graduate schools of social work have given scant attention to
the methods of implementing quality control in social ser-
vices. Two texts published with the support of national
professional social work bodies do not cover quality control
methods. Both devote space to the related subjects of program
evaluation and accountability systems. Both allude to
controlling and central management process, but do not relate
this generalized concept to the specific elements of standard
setting and sampling which are a part of modern quality control.
(Schatz, 1970; Trecker, 1971) A recent text which does ad-
mirably discuss the specific problems in utilizing written
communication to clients, also fails to cover quality control
methods (Ehlers, op. cit.). The most recent text published
by the official Council on Social Work Education Siavin, 1978)
also fails to discuss quality control. It does however,
allude to the use of client satisfaction as a measure of agency
performance, a related concept (Hoshino, 1978). One popular
business text sometimes used in social work courses does
provide detailed exposure to the principles and steps in
quality control, including the development of standards,
measurements, sampling, control points, and corrections of
deviations from standards. (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1972, 1978)
Social Work students and teachers must themselves apply the
concepts to appropriate social services situations. It must
be concluded that most social work administration trainees
continue to be educated without texts which cover quality
control as an essential skill for managers to use to improve
efficiency and effectiveness.
Error repair circuits describe the set of structures and
procedures in an organization which come into play auto-
3The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is
now establishing error rate norms for payment errors in its
aid programs (UPI, July 11, 1978). However, it is unclear
how or if adversely affected clients who complain will re-
ceive faster responses.
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matically when an outsider, a client or customer, complains
of error to a representative of the agency. Error repair
circuits which would enable the agencies to respond defini-
tively to complaints within three weeks would necessarily
Include the following elements:
1. Easily accessable complaint receiving staff who's where-
abouts are well known to the public, and who are in
sufficient numbers to treat complaining clients as
dignified individuals;
2. An executive clearly responsible for aiding this staff
in carrying out rapid investigations;
3. An executive with sufficient authority to interpret rules,
judge complaints, and order either remediation of errors
or rejection of the com'plairnt;
4. Monitoring of standards of communication which require
that letters be written which are understandable by
clients (which unfortunately suggests the level of
5th or 6th grade in most cases);
5. Record keeping systems which track complaint cases from
receipt to resolution to determine timeliness;
6. Record systems which aggregate complaint data for use by
executives to assess procedures and correct personnel and
procedures; and
7. Executive utilization of the aggregate data.
Modern quality control systems, coupled with rewards to
agencies and executives who perform with low error rates can
produce sharp improvements in services to clients with low
market power. Cabinet Secretaries are free to establish and
enforce quality control standards, and one has done so at least
in the case of requiring states to not excede certain error
levels in their AFDC programs. Error repair circuits which
respond quickly to client complaints are a necessary ingredient
in large agencies dispensing valuable entitlements if they are
to repair their errors and retain the support of citizen-clients.
SECTION VII: SUMMARY
This article has argued that high error rates in federal
entitlement dispensing agencies and slow responses to com-
plaining clients results primarily from the monopolistic
nature of the market relationship between clients and agercies.
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Secondarily, we also argue that the absence of quality
control systems, and error repair circuits tuned to clients,
make it unlikely that error rates and response times will
fall. The absence of these systems also reflects the low
power of the clients. Data was presented on the magnitude
of Congressional Casework efforts serving clients who com-
plain to Members about government services. Three approaches
including continued Congressional casework, were assessed for
their probable ability to lower error rates, to provoke
system level improvements, to change the power relationships
between agencies and clients, and to be enacted politically.
Congressional casework met the criteria of changing power
relations and being politically acceptable, although it has
distinct weaknesses. Two other solutions were assessed and
regretably judged either politically unfeasible or having too
little power to change relationships. One of the two most
frequently complained against bureaus (HEW's Social Security
Administration and the related Supplemental Security Income
Program) has taken the initial step of setting a 4% standard
of tolerance for payment errors.
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